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Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes about
Citizen Influence on Government
SHAUN

BOWLER AND TODD DONOVAN*

will
Theoristssuchas CarolePatemanandBenjaminBarbersuggestthatdemocraticparticipation
engagecitizensandleadthemto havemorepositiveregardforpoliticalprocessesanddemocratic
practices.The Americanstatesprovidea settingwhereprovisionsfor directvoterparticipation
in legislationvarysubstantially.
If participatory
institutionshave an 'educativerole' thatshapes
perceptionsof government,thencitizensexposedto directdemocracymaybe morelikelyto claim
They
theyunderstand
politicsandbe morelikelyto perceivethattheyarecapableof participation.
may also be morelikely to perceivethatgovernmentis responsiveto them.We mergedataon
state-levelpoliticalinstitutionswithdatafromthe 1992AmericanNationalElectionStudyto test
thesehypotheseswith OLSmodels.Ourprimaryhypothesesfindsupport.We presentevidence
thatthe effects of exposureto directdemocracyon internalandexternalpoliticalefficacyrival
the effects of formaleducation.

Recent scholarship has sought to understand citizen attitudes about government
and high levels of cynicism about democratic politics.' Much of this work has
considered the impact of socio-demographic changes over the past generation.
Some work in this area has extended our understanding of attitudes towards
government by incorporating the effects of institutional arrangements themselves. An important component of these explanations has been the link between
voter assessments of institutions and whether the voter 'wins' or 'loses' under
those institutions. In shaping how fully someone may win or lose, and most

* Department
of
of PoliticalScience,Universityof California
Riverside;andDepartment

PoliticalScience,WesternWashingtonUniversity,respectively.Earlierversionsof thisarticlewere
presentedat the PacificNorthwestPoliticalScience Association,Eugene,Oregon,1999, and the
Midwest Political Science Association meeting, Chicago, 2000. Authorshipis equal. Direct
to T. Donovan,Departmentof PoliticalScience,WesternWashingtonUniversity,
correspondence
Bellingham,WA 98552, USA.
1

Pippa Norris, Critical Citizens: Global Supportfor Democratic Governance (Oxford: Oxford

UniversityPress,1999);MarcHetherington,'TheEffectof PoliticalTruston thePresidentialVote,
1968-96', AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,93 (1999), 311-26; Ola Listhaug,'Confidencein
PoliticalInstitutions:
Norway,1982-1996' (paperpresentedat the CentreforNordicPolicyStudies,
Aberdeen, 1998); Stephen Craig, Broken Contract? Changing Relationships Between Americans and
their Government (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996); Stephen Craig, The Malevolent Leaders:

PopularDiscontentinAmerica(Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress,1993);JohnHibbingandElizabeth
Theiss-Morse,Congressas Public Enemy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1995); M.
KaaseandK. Newton,Beliefsin Government
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1995);Hans-Dieter
Klingemanand DieterFuchs,Citizensand the State(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1995).
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especially in determining how badly someone loses, institutions themselves
colour how voters may view the political process.2
Much, but not all, of this work has been cross-national in scope. In part this
is because worries over growing cynicism about politics seemingly affect the
industrial democracies in general.3 Cross-national studies allow for variation in
institutional setting and so allow scholars to test institutionally based
explanations. We follow the work of Frey4 and Frey and Stutzer5 to examine
the question of whether institutional variation within one country, in this case
the United States, can help explain variation in individual attitudes about a
citizen's capacity to influence what governments do. Like Mendelsohn and
Cutler6 and Frey and Stutzer, we examine the institution of direct democracy
and the contribution it makes to citizen attitudes about influencing government.
The main hypothesis of interest in what follows is that exposure to more
frequent use of state-level direct democracy can cause citizens to have more
positive attitudes about their abilities to influence the political system, and to
have more positive attitudes about how government responds to them.
Attitudinal measures of this capacity, or efficacy, are usually separated
conceptually into two categories of internal and external efficacy.7 In short, we
test whether citizens who are frequently exposed to decisions made by ballot
initiative are more likely to see themselves as having resources and skills that
allow them to influence what government does (internal efficacy), and whether
they are more likely to see that government responds to them (external efficacy).
Political efficacy is of interest here because it can play an important role in
shaping a wide range of attitudes and behaviour. Internal efficacy represents a
sense of 'being capable of acting effectively in the political realm', and external
2

ChrisAndersonandChristineGuillory,'PoliticalInstitutionsandSatisfactionwithDemocracy:
A Cross-NationalAnalysisof Consensusand Majoritarian
Systems',AmericanPolitical Science
Review,91 (1997), 66-81; ChrisAndersonandAndrewLoTempio,'Winning,LosingandPolitical
Trustin America',BritishJournalof PoliticalScience,32 (2002), 335-51; StacyGordonandGary
Segura, 'Cross NationalVariationin the Political Sophisticationof Individuals:Capabilityof
Choice?' Journalof Politics, 59 (1997), 126-47; Ola Listhaugand M. Wiberg,'Confidencein
PoliticalandPrivateInstitutions'in KlingemanandFuchs,eds, CitizensandtheState;HaroldClarke
andAlanAcock, 'NationalElectionsandPoliticalAttitudes:TheCaseof PoliticalEfficacy',British
Journalof PoliticalScience, 19 (1989), 551-62.
3 Norris,CriticalCitizens.
4 BrunoFrey, 'A Constitutionfor KnavesCrowdsOutCivic Virtues',EconomicJournal,107
(1997), 1043-53.
5 BrunoFreyandAlois Stutzer,'Happiness,EconomyandInstitutions'(InstituteforEmpirical
Researchin Economics,Universityof Zurich,WorkingPaperNo. 15, 1999).
6 MatthewMendelsohnandFredCutler,'The Effectof Referendums
on DemocraticCitizens:
Knowledge,Politicization,EfficacyandTolerance',BritishJournalof PoliticalScience,30 (2000),
685-98.
7 RobertLane,Political Life: Whyand How People Get Involvedin Politics (New York:Free
Press, 1959);GeorgeBalch, 'MultipleIndicatorsin SurveyResearch:The Conceptof "Senseof
PoliticalEfficacy"', PoliticalMethodology,1 (1974), 1-43; StephenCraigandMichaelMaggiotto,
'MeasuringPoliticalEfficacy',PoliticalMethodology,8 (1982), 85-110.
on PoliticalEfficacy:A PanelAnalysis',
8 StevenFinkel, 'ReciprocalEffectsof Participation
AmericanJournalof Political Science,29 (1985), 289-314, p. 289.
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efficacy has been found to affect political trust,9system support,10and electoral
participation.11
Carole Pateman contends that democratic participation has an 'educative'
role in the workplace, and writes of 'the human results that accrue through the
participatory process'.12 To Pateman, these results include increased selfconfidence for individuals and acquisition of the skills that citizens needed to
participate, both of which comprise internal political efficacy. Other theorists
suggest that political participation might simply instill passive acceptance of a
regime - particularly in a standard electoral context where voters choose
between parties or candidates. Electoral participation may thus promote feelings
of system legitimacy and governmental responsiveness, affecting external
efficacy but not internal efficacy.13 As we discuss below, however, there are
solid theoretical reasons to expect that initiative and referendum elections
present a context that is distinct from standardcandidate and party elections, and
that direct democracy can thus affect both internal and external political
efficacy.
DIRECT

DEMOCRACY

AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Many of the debates over direct democracy have concerned normative questions
about the relative merits of direct versus representative democracy. This, in turn,
has been tied to the related questions of whether or not direct democracy
produces good or bad public policy, and whose interests it serves.'4 Regardless
9 StephenCraig, 'Efficacy,Trustand PoliticalBehavior:An Attemptto Resolve a Lingering
Conceptual Dilemma', American Politics Quarterly, 7 (1979), 225-39.

10 Shanto
Iyengar,'SubjectivePoliticalEfficacyas a Measureof DiffuseSupport',PublicOpinion

Quarterly, 44 (1980), 249-56.

Explanationof DecreasingTurnoutin PresidentialElections,
11 StephenShaffer,'A Multivariate

1960-1976', American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981), 68-96; Paul Abramson and John

in America',AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,
Aldrich,'The Decline of ElectoralParticipation
76 (1982), 592-621.
12

Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1970), pp. 24-5. It is importantto note that Patemanmakes no claims that large-scale
in theelectoralarenacouldproducethe sameeffectsas small(workplace)settingsthat
participation
allow for discussionandpersonalinteractions.We distil ourhypothesisfromher theory,andfrom
on ballot
proponentsof mass-leveldirectdemocracynotedbelow.We do notclaimthatparticipation
initiativequestionscan have the same qualitativeeffects on efficacy as small-scaledemocratic
participation.
13 See, for example, Benjamin Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent: Elections, Citizen

Controland Popular Acquiescence(Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley,1982), at p. 182. For
empiricalevidence from candidateelections, see Finkel, 'ReciprocalEffects of Participationon
PoliticalEfficacy'.
14 For an extensive review of these debates, see Elizabeth Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest
Group Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1999); Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan, Demanding Choices: Opinion and Voting in Direct
Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy:
The Politics of Initiative, Referendum and Recall (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
1989); David Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the US (Baltimore, Md:

JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress, 1984).
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of academic conclusions about the merits of the process, there is substantial
evidence of high levels of public satisfaction with direct democracy. Surveys
of citizens in California,15 Washington,16 Oregon,17 and Florida18 find over
two-thirds of respondents having favourable attitudes towards their state's
initiative process.
Other strands of discussions over the value of direct democracy, at least
among proponents, have sought to emphasize the role it will play in motivating
and energizing a sense of civic engagement and participation.19It is an argument
clearly in keeping with a long-held tradition from classical democratic theory
that participation is not just of value in and of itself, but that it also has an
educative role that promotes civic engagement and wider virtues.20 Similar
themes have been echoed at least since de Tocqueville's observation that
citizens learn political skills via participation in voluntary organizations.21
Almond and Verba's study of citizen attitudes, for example, found that
experiences with democratic decision making in schools or in families were
related to adult participation in politics and to the belief that individuals can
influence government. The effect held for citizens in Britain, Germany, Italy and
Mexico.22
As applied to contemporary direct democracy, the anticipated effects of
participation have often been couched in terms of an expected favourable impact
on turnout rates23and increased civic engagement.24 Hard data, however, has

15 Michael Hagen and EdwardLascher, 'Public Opinion about Direct Democracy'(paper
presentedat theAnnualMeetingof theAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,Boston,1998);Jack
Citrin,'Who'stheBoss?DirectDemocracyandPopularControlof Government',in StephenCraig,
ed., BrokenContract(Boulder,Colo.:WestviewPress, 1996), pp. 268-93, at p. 272.
16 Authors'annualstatewidesurvey(1999), on file.
17Tim Hibbits,OregonPublicOpinionPolls, on file with authors(1999).
18 StephenCraig,Aimee KreppelandJ. Kane, 'PublicOpinionandDirectDemocracy:A Case
Study', in Matthew Mendelsohn and Andrew Parkin, eds, Referendum Democracy: Citizens, Elites
and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns (Basingstoke, Hants.: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 25-46.
'19 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984); Ian Budge, The New Challenge of Direct Democracy

(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996).

20 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, p. 25; Michael Morell, 'Citizens' Evaluations

of Participatory
DemocraticProcedures:NormativeTheoryMeets EmpiricalScience', Political
Research Quarterly, 52 (1999), 293-322.
21 Alexis de Tocqueville,Democracy in America: VolumeII, translated
by HenryReeve, Phillips

Bradley,ed. (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1945 [1840], pp. 114-18; Also see RobertPutnam,

Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 1993).
22 GabrielAlmondand Sidney Verba,The Civic Culture(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 1963).
23 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 235-6; Cronin, Direct Democracy, p. 11; Budge, The New
Challenge of Direct Democracy; David Butler and Austin Ranney, ReferendumsAround the World:
The Growing Use of Direct Democracy (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1994), pp. 15-16.
24 Barber, Strong Democracy, pp. 284-5; David Schmidt, Citizen Lawmaking: The Ballot

InitiativeRevolution(Philadelphia,Penn.:TempleUniversityPress, 1989).
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cast some doubt on the stimulating effects of direct democracy on turnout.25The
more subtle effects of direct democracy on citizen attitudes about politics in the
United States has rarely been tested,26and studies of the effects of participation
in legislative and executive elections in West Germany and the United States
found that the act of voting might lead citizens to have a sense of greater
governmental responsiveness, but that it does not cause feelings of increased
political competence (internal efficacy).27 A rare empirical test of Pateman's
theory in the workplace, however, found that greater democratization in
industrial work settings was associated with higher levels of political efficacy.28
Although exposure to referendum questions may not have the same educative
effects as workplace democracy, it is reasonable to expect that referendums
could have a greater effect on efficacy than elections to select representatives,
as these latter decisions mediate the relationship between the citizen and policy
outcomes. Work on Switzerland,29 for example, found signs of greater civic
virtues and even happiness (in an attitudinal sense) in cantons that used direct,
rather than just representative, democracy. Mendelsohn and Cutler also found
evidence that the mass public learned about constitutional questions during the
1992 Charlottetown Constitutional Accord in Canada, but they found no effect
on efficacy.30 To be sure, these more general and attitudinal arguments have
been presented before in the United States. Cronin, for example, notes one of
the early arguments favouring direct democracy was that 'giving the citizen
more of a role in governmental processes might lessen alienation and apathy'.31
A key point here is that there have been no systematic tests of these more
subtle effects of direct democracy in the setting of the United States, where the
citizen's initiative device is used quite frequently. The issue of whether or not
direct democracy has any effect on civic engagement has relevance to wider
25 Cronin, Direct Democracy, pp. 227-8;
Magleby, Direct Legislation, pp. 96-8; D. Everson,
'The Effects of Initiatives on Voter Turnout: A Comparative State Analysis', Western Political
Quarterly, 34 (1981), 415-25. Studies that do show a relationship between initiatives and turnout

includeMarkSmith,'BallotInitiatives,VoterInterest,andTurnout'(paperpresentedat the annual
meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, 1999); Caroline Tolbert, John Gummel
and Daniel Smith, 'The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the American States' (paper

presentedat the annualmeetingof the AmericanPoliticalScience Association,Washington,DC,
2000).
26 Fornull findingsat the bivariatelevel fromthe UnitedStates,see Citrin,'Who's the Boss?'
On Canada,see Mendelsohnand Cutler,'The Effect of Referendumson DemocraticCitizens'.
27 Forclaimsaboutthe limitedeffects of representative
electionson self-perceivedcompetence
on PoliticalEfficacy',at p. 908;
(internalefficacy),see Finkel,'ReciprocalEffectsof Participation
on PoliticalEfficacyandSupport:Evidencefroma West
StevenFinkel,'TheEffectsof Participation
GermanPanelStudy',Journalof Politics, 49 (1987), 441-64, at p. 461.
28 J. MaxwellElden, 'PoliticalEfficacyat Work:The ConnectionbetweenMore Autonomous
Formsof WorkplaceOrganizationanda MoreParticipatory
Politics',AmericanPolitical Science

Review, 75 (1981), 43-58.
29 Frey, 'A Constitution
for KnavesCrowdsOutCivic Virtues';Frey and Stutzer,'Happiness,
EconomyandInstitutions'.
3o MendelsohnandCutler,'TheEffect of Referendumson DemocraticCitizens'.

31 Cronin, Direct Democracy, p. 11.
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debates over the foundations of citizen attitudes towards government, and the
issue of how such attitudes are rooted in institutional structuresthemselves. One
question to be addressed before moving further is why direct democracy might
have such a positive impact on voter attitudes.
By definition direct democracy gives people a chance to participate in
decisions that formally shape public policy and, as we noted above, this has long
been held by some democratic theorists to be of value. Both the opportunity to
participate, as well as the act of participation on policy decisions, can be
expected to promote more positive views about the efficacy of individual
political activity. At one level, it gives the mass public an occasional voice in
government and provides some means - at least in principle - of ensuring that
the public is consulted (or anticipated) in discussions about major policy issues.
Work on Canadian attitudes about government, for example, points to the
importance of being 'listened to' as a factor that shapes citizen attitudes about
representative government generally.32 In a sense direct democracy assures
voters that government either is listening to them or has to listen to them at some
point.
At a second level, direct democracy provides an additional mechanism for
citizens to shape policy outcomes. Voting on policy provides citizens another
method, in addition to representative government, for expressing their consent
or opposition to what the government might do (or might not do). The degree
to which government policy actually reflects voter desires is a matter of debate,
yet there is some evidence that policy more closely matches mass preferences
in the American states that use direct democracy than in those states that lack
direct democracy.33The effect of initiatives on policy could be direct, via voters
approving legislation, or indirect, via pressure that the threatof initiatives places
on legislators. In the realm of mass attitudes, however, part of what might matter
is that voters simply believe their voices will be heard by public officials when
citizens vote directly on issues. Likewise, they may believe they are heard in
ways perceived to be qualitatively different than they are when their
32

F. Graves, with T. Dugas and P. Beauchamp,'Identity and National Attachmentsin
Canada(1)', in HarveyLazarand Tom McIntosh,eds, Canada:The State of the
Contemporary
Federation1998-99 (Kingston,Ont.: Institutefor Intergovernmental
Relations,Vol. 13: How

Canadians
Connect,
forthcoming).

33 Forevidence,see ElizabethGerber,'LegislativeResponseto theThreatof PopularInitiatives',
American Journal of Political Science, 40 (1996), 99-128; Elizabeth Gerber, 'Legislatures,

The Effects of StateLegislativeInstitutionson Policy', Political
Initiatives,and Representation:
ResearchQuarterly, 49 (1996), 263-86; John Matsusaka,'Fiscal Effectsof the VoterInitiative:
EvidencefromtheLast30 Years',Journalof PoliticalEconomy,103 (1995),587-623. Incontrast,
see EdwardLascher,MichaelHagenandStevenRochlin,'GunBehindtheDoor?BallotInitiatives,
State Policies and Public Opinion',Journal of Politics, 58 (1996), 760-75; John Camobreco,
'Preferences,FiscalPoliciesandtheInitiativeProcess',Journalof Politics,60 (1998), 819-29. For
a relateddiscussionof how PR electionlaws may bringlegislatorscloserto voterpreferencesthan
SMD election laws, see G. Bingham Powell Jr. and Georg S. Vanberg, 'Election Laws,
and MedianCorrespondence:
Disproportionality
Implicationsfor Two Visions of Democracy',
British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000), 383-411.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:46:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes

377

participation is limited to selecting representatives once every few years. When
voting directly on initiatives and referendums, they may be one step closer to
affecting policy outcomes than when they vote for candidates.
Institutions of direct democracy thus provide a political context where many
citizens must consider and decide upon public issues and policies - at least
relatively more so than in a standardelectoral context. Where initiatives appear
frequently on state ballots, it is more likely that active campaigns or media
coverage might focus public attention on a major public issue or set of issues.
In such an environment, citizens may feel more competent about their political
skills as they receive more policy-relevant information than would have
otherwise been the case, at least at some minimal level. Many voters who
participate on ballot questions will also deliberate about how to vote on issues
by using multiple sources of information and by seeking out cues about who
supports or opposes the measure.34
Frey's argument goes further than this. He argues that in allowing citizens
to participate in policy decisions, direct democracy bolsters civic virtues since
the very system tells voters they are to be trusted. When treated as trustworthy,
voters respond by being less cynical. The institution of direct democracy
represents a constitutional expression of trust in citizens, in contrast to the more
familiar constitutional expressions of mistrust.35
HYPOTHESES

One of the main hypotheses of interest, then, is that experience with direct
democracy should promote more positive attitudes about the prospects for, and
consequences of, citizen participation in the political system. Since we expect
that institutions which provide extra-legislative opportunities for mass influence
on policy are most relevant to the discussion above, we focus on experience with
direct citizen initiatives in the states, rather than legislative referendums. And
since it is relative levels of exposure to the practice of direct democracy that we
expect to be of consequence, we treat direct democracy as a continuous variable
here.36Some states have formal mechanisms for use of the initiative, yet barriers
such as court scrutiny and/or qualification hurdles can be such that, in practice,
initiatives are rarely used in places where the institution exists (such as Illinois,
Mississippi and Wyoming). Other states allowing the initiative have much more

34 ArthurLupia,'Shortcuts
Information
andVotingBehaviorin California
VersusEncyclopedias:
InsuranceReformElections',AmericanPolitical ScienceReview,88 (1994), 63-76; Bowler and

Donovan, Demanding Choices.

Frey, 'A Constitutionfor KnavesCrowdsOut Civic Virtues,'pp. 1048-9.
Ourmodels were also estimatedwith an ordinalmeasureof initiativeuse, foundin Caroline
Tolbert,'ChangingRules for StateLegislatures',in ShaunBowler, ToddDonovanand Caroline
35
36

Tolbert, eds, Citizens as Legislators: Direct Democracy in the United States (Columbus: Ohio State

UniversityPress, 1998),pp. 180-1. The substantiveresultsremainthe same.Intervalmeasuresare
morereadilyinterpreted,so those arereportedhere.
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experience with the process, although there is great variation in use, with
California, North Dakota and Oregon having used initiatives most frequently.37
One of the only existing studies to examine the relationship between direct
democracy and Americans' attitudes about government38examined state-level
attitudes in aggregate, while treating the presence of direct democracy as a
simple dichotomy. This method failed to detect differences across states.
However, if actual exposure to direct democracy leads citizens to have a greater
sense that they can influence government, we should expect that frequency of
initiative use39 in a citizen's state explains some variation in individual-level
attitudes about political efficacy. We expect more initiatives generally to lead
to greater efficacy, but we also examine whether this relationship is non-linear.
It may be that modest levels of initiative use increase efficacy, but beyond some
point citizens may be overwhelmed - very high levels of use thus might cause
them to feel less capable of having influence.
Running counter to this are two broad lines of argument. First, variants of this
'opportunities for participation breeds efficacy' hypothesis have had a
disappointing history. Real-world voters are often not nearly as responsive to
the opportunities to participate as academics and intellectuals would like.40 The
underwhelming track record of American mass political participation, and
uniformly low levels of trust in government in the United States,41 suggest that
the null hypothesis offers a fairly good chance of being supported in the
American context.
Secondly, the general literature on public regard for government tells us we
must also account for rival hypotheses about other institutional effects that may
well swamp that of direct democracy. One key factor is whether the voter
supported candidates who lost in recent elections. That is, if the voter's preferred
candidates for office lost at election time, then the voter might come to feel that
she has less 'voice' in government and could be correspondingly gloomier about
the responsiveness of government to her needs.42 Contrary to Pateman's theory
that greater participation in decisions will make citizens 'better' at democratic
participating,43the fact that a citizen is on the losing side of decisions might
make her lose interest in politics, or at least lead her to have less sense that
participation has positive consequences. State level variation in electoral results
37 Fordiscussion,see CarolineTolbert,DanielLowesteinandToddDonovan,'ElectionLawand
RulesforUsingInitiatives,'in Bowler,DonovanandTolbert,eds,Citizensas Legislators,pp.27-54.
38 Citrin,'Who's the Boss?' 287.
p.
39 For a discussionof the advantagesof measuringthe use of directdemocracyratherthanthe
simple existenceof formalprovisionsfor its use, see A. Landnerand M. Brandle,'Does Direct
DemocracyMatterfor PoliticalParties?An EmpiricalTest in the Swiss Cantons',PartyPolitics,
5 (1999), 283-302.
40 However, see Morell, 'Citizens' Evaluations of
Participatory Democratic Procedures'.
41 Craig, Broken Contract?
42

Listhaug, 'Confidence in Political Institutions'; Norris, Critical Citizens; Anderson and

LoTempio,'Winning,LosingandPoliticalTrustin America';ClarkeandAcock, 'NationalElections
and PoliticalAttitudes'.
43 Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, p. 25.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:46:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Democracy, Institutions and Attitudes

379

allows us to control for how individual voters stand in relation to the political
system - as a 'winner' or 'loser' in terms of the candidates they supported at
the top of the ballot.
Another hypothesis from the broader literature suggests that fragmented
control of political institutions can affect citizens' perceptions of governmental
responsiveness. Listhaug and Wiberg's cross-national work, for example,
shows that aside from economic conditions, the factors which strongly influence
the degree of voter confidence in European governments are the (short) duration
of governments and the number of parties in government. Multi-party coalitions
and short-lived governments are viewed more negatively.44 The rise and fall of
coalition governments and interpartybickering among coalition partners are, of
course, not to be found in the American states. A rough analogy, however, might
be that of divided government: voters living in states with divided government
may find it more difficult to perceive who is responsible for policy outcomes.
This could cause them to be less likely to believe they can direct government
or hold it accountable. They may also be more likely to have a gloomier view
of the governmental process than voters living where unified party control
makes for less partisan bickering - at least in principle.
In addition to these controls for rival institutional effects, models estimating
attitudes about personal political abilities and governmental responsiveness
should also include terms for individual-level factors known to affect efficacy
generally. Political and attitudinal attributes should also be accounted for.
Strong partisans for example, having a more coherent approach to viewing their
political world, could be expected to have a greater sense of efficacy than
independents and weak partisans. Economic evaluations have also been found
to affect electoral support for government,45 and also affect general attitudes
about trust in government.46
Age, likewise, has been found to be related to trust and confidence in
government. Citizens in younger age cohorts have been shown to have more
cynicism about their relationships with government, and thus can have lower
levels of efficacy.47 Social characteristics such as gender, education and race are
also expected to structurehow individuals perceive their capacity to affect what
government does. Women may perceive themselves as having less influence in
politics, leading them to be less likely to score high on efficacy measures.48
Formal education is expected to give citizens resources and skills that help them
negotiate the political world, so higher levels of education are thus one of the

44 ListhaugandWiberg,'Confidencein PoliticalandPrivateInstitutions,'pp. 310-11.
45 For a review, see Michael Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western

Democracies(AnnArbor:Universityof MichiganPress, 1988).
46 Hetherington,
'TheEffect of PoliticalTruston the PresidentialVote, 1968-96'.
47 M. Kent Jenningsand RichardNiemi, Generationsand Politics (Princeton,NJ: Princeton
UniversityPress, 1981).
48

Paul Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change (San Francisco:

Freeman,1983).
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main determinants of higher levels of political efficacy.49 The relationship
between race (and minority ethnicity), direct democratic institutions and
efficacy may be complex. Several highly visible ballot initiatives have targeted
legislative policies that advanced minority interests50and campaigns might turn
mass opinions against minorities targeted by initiatives."1 This might lead
minorities to have less efficacy where they are more frequently exposed to
initiative politics.
MODEL SPECIFICATION

The existing literature has demonstrated that political efficacy is a multidimensional phenomena, with two unique dimensions encompassing views of
personal political abilities, or internal efficacy, and political influence, or
external efficacy.52The 1992 American National Election Study (NES) provides
a fine opportunity to study factors that affect citizen attitudes on each of these
dimensions.53In addition to standardquestions about governmental responsiveness to citizens, the 1992 post-election study included a larger than usual array
of questions on attitudes about the individual's sense of his or her own political
abilities, and thus provides instruments that tap both internal and external
political efficacy. A report on the first use of these measures in the 1987 NES
Pilot Study and 1988 NES post-election study found that the items we use as
measures of internal efficacy represent a single concept distinct from external
efficacy and political trust.54
49 Forevidenceof the effect of educationon efficacy,see SidneyVerba,NancyBurnsandKay
Schlozman,'Knowingand CaringaboutPolitics:Genderand PoliticalEngagement,'Journalof
Politics, 59 (1997), 1051-72; Paul Abramson, Political Attitudes in America (San Francisco,

Freeman,1983);CarolCassel and David Hill, 'Explanationsof TurnoutDecline: A Multivariate
Test',AmericanPolitics Quarterly,9 (1981), 181-95; BernadetteHayesandClive Bean,'Political
Efficacy:A ComparativeStudyof the UnitedStates,West Germany,GreatBritainandAustralia',
European Journal of Political Research, 23 (1993), 261-80.

50 Examples since the 1960s include measures attacking fair housing, desegregationof
schoolbusing,welfareservices,andaffirmativeaction.Forevidenceof theadverse
accommodation,
effects of initiativeson minorities,see BarbaraGamble,'PuttingCivil Rightsto a Vote',American
Journalof PoliticalScience,91 (1997), 245-69, andDerrickBellJr,'TheReferendum:
Democracy's
Barrierto RacialEquality',Washington
LawReview,54 (1978), 1-29. In contrast,see BrunoFrey
andL. Gotte,'Doesthe PopularVoteDestroyCivil Rights?'AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience,
42 (1998), 1343-8 andToddDonovanandShaunBowler,'DirectDemocracyandMinorityRights:
An Extension', American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998), 1020-5.
51 James Wenzel, Todd Donovan and Shaun Bowler, 'Direct Democracy and Minorities:
ChangingAttitudesaboutMinoritiesTargetedby Initiatives',in Bowler,DonovanandTolbert,eds,

Citizens as Legislators, pp. 228-48.
52 Abramson,Political Attitudes in America; Balch, 'MultipleIndicatorsin SurveyResearch';
Lane, Political Life.

53 The 1992NES sampleincludesrespondentswho werepartof a multi-wavepanelstudy.Since
repeatedexposureto surveysaboutpoliticsmightbiasmeasuresof politicalefficacy,we havelimited
our sampleto cases who werepartof the 'freshwave' of 1992 respondents(i.e., respondentswho
were not previouslyinterviewedin an earlierwave of the panel).
54 RichardNiemi,StephenCraigandFrancoMattei,'MeasuringInternalPoliticalEfficacyin the
1988 National Election Study', American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 1407-13.
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We conducted a Principal Components Analysis of seven efficacy measures
relevant to this study, and results indicate that there are two distinct factors that
structure responses. The four questions designed to measure internal efficacy
load on a single, unique factor, while the two external efficacy questions load
on a second unique factor.55This suggests strongly that each respective set of
items measures unique attitudinal phenomena, and that the items can be used
to construct distinct indices of internal and external efficacy.
Respondents were asked, for example, whether they felt government was too
complicated for them to understand, whether they felt they were qualified to
participatein politics, whether they thought they could do as good ajob in public
office as others, and whether they thought themselves to be better or less
informed about politics than other people. We use the responses to these
questions as separate dependent variables in our assessment of the effect of
direct democracy on respondents' perceptions of their own personal capabilities
as a citizen - or their internal efficacy. Scores on these four items are then
summed to create a general index of internal efficacy.56
The 1992 NES survey also provides items that measure perceptions of how
responsive government might be to citizens. For the second portion of our
analysis, we use as our dependent variables two questions that ask respondents
whether 'people like [them]' have any say in what government does, and
whether government officials care about what 'people like [them]' think. These
questions, we assume, are more likely to tap attitudes about external efficacy.
Again, we use a summary index of these items to create a general measure of
external efficacy.57
Our independent variables are divided into three broad categories. The first
group tests for the effects of institutions on attitudes. We account for frequency
of direct democracy use with data from Tolbert et al. on the number of times
that initiatives appeared on state ballots since the original date a state adopted
procedures for the initiative." Scores on this variable range from 0 for
See the web versionof this articlefor this material.
Cronbach'
s aforthefour-iterminternalefficacyindexis 0.76. See thewebversionof thisarticle
for an appendixthatincludesquestionwordingand codings.
s aforthetwo-termexternalefficacyindexis 0.68.We alsoestimatedmodelsof these
57 Cronbach'
indicesusing factorscoresfromthe respectiveinternalefficacyandexternalefficacycomponents
generatedfrom the PrincipalComponentsAnalysis.This producedno substantivechangein our
results.Estimatesof theindicesallowformorestraightforward
of effects.See the web
interpretation
versionof this articlefor an appendixthatincludesquestionwordingand codings,as well as the
principlecomponentanalysisresults.
58 Tolbert,LowensteinandDonovan,'ElectionLaw andRulesfor Using Initiatives',in Bowler,
DonovanandTolbert,eds, Citizensas Legislators,p. 29. An alternativeversionof ourmodel was
estimatedwitha measureof stateinitiativeuse limitedto 1980-92, ratherthanfrequencyof use since
adoption.Hypothesistestsusingthatmodelproducedresultsidenticalto whatis reportedin Tables
1 and2. Whenthemodelwasestimatedusinga dummytermfortheeffectof initiatives(where1 = the
stateallows initiatives),the effect for directdemocracyis generallysignificant,but less consistent
thanwhatis reportedhere.Modelfit is slightlyhigherwhenfrequencyof use is used ratherthana
dummyterm.
55
56
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non-initiative states (and Mississippi) to between 3 to 274 for initiative states.59
We use this rather than the number of initiatives on a state's ballot at the time
of the survey because we believe it is the cumulative effect of exposure to direct
democracy that should shape citizen attitudes.60 A respondent's status as a
'loser' in elections is represented by a variable coded 1 to represent respondents
who voted for a losing presidential candidate in 1992. Likewise, a similar
dummy term reflects whether the candidate who won the 1992 US Senate
seat in the respondent's state came from a party other than the party the
respondent identified with. Residence in states where control of the legislature
was divided between parties, or where different parties controlled the governor's
office and at least one legislative chamber, was also represented with a dummy
variable.
The second category of variables account for political and attitudinalfactors
that might affect efficacy. We include dummy terms for strong Democrats,
strong Republicans and independents who do not lean to either party. The
reference category is thus weak partisans and independents who 'lean' towards
either party. These citizens have less interest in politics, and we expect them to
have less efficacy as a result of their low interest and weak ties to parties.61The
model also includes measures of state and national economic evaluations (where
high scores reflect economic worries).
The final category of variables represent social and demographic factors
discussed above (age, gender, race and education).62We include an interaction
between race (non-white) and initiative use to test if direct democracy reduces
the political efficacy of non-whites.63It is also possible that cultural or regional
effects might structure individual efficacy, and these effects could covary with
a state's use of direct democracy. States that use initiatives more frequently, for
59 Respondents
fromthirty-three
stateswereincludedin theNESsample.Of the 1,126totalcases,
41 percentaredrawnfromthirteendifferentinitiativestates.TheseincludeCalifornia(9.6 percent
of all cases), Michigan(6.4 per cent),Arizona(5.6 percent), Florida(4.6 percent), Massachusetts
(3.5 percent),Illinois(2.8 percent),Missouri(2.3 percent),Ohio(1.5 percent),Arkansas(1.2 per
cent),Oregon(1.1percent),Colorado(1.1 percent),Washington(0.9 percent),andWyoming(0.6
per cent). Arkansas,Arizona,Colorado,California,Massachusetts,OregonandWashingtonscore
high on eithermeasureof initiativeuse.
60 Stateswithmostfrequentuse of initiativesoverthisperiodare:Oregon(274),California(232),
NorthDakota(160), Colorado(150), Arizona(133), Washington(91), Arkansas(80), Oklahoma
(79), Missouri(60) and Ohio (58).
61 Empirically,thereis no distinctionbetweenthe low levels of interestof weak partisansand
independentswho lean towardsa party.We use 'pure'independentsas a dummyvariable(rather
thanas ourreferencecategory)as theyaredistinguishedfromweakpartisansandindependents
who
leanby lowerlevels of participation.
See WilliamFlaniganandNancyZingale,PoliticalBehavior
of theAmericanElectorate(Washington,DC: CongressionalQuarterlyPress, 1998),pp. 77-9.
62 See the web versionof the
paperfor codingsof these variables.
63 The non-whitecategoryincludesLatinos.All models
reportedhere were also estimatedwith

anadditional
forrespondent's
variable
income(V924105).
testsforourmain
controlling
Significance
hypothesesare unchangedwhen incomeis included.Model fit with incomeis lowerin five of the
eight estimationsreportedhere. Due to this, and the fact thatrefusalson this questionreducethe
sample,modelsare reportedwithoutincome.
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example, could have a political history and culture that led them to adopt the
initiative, and that history might still affect contemporary political behaviour
and attitudes.64Likewise, western states that make more frequent use of the
initiative tend to have greater in-migration, which could also covary with a more
efficacious population. Each factor could cause an observed relationship
between initiative use and efficacy to be spurious.
We control for these factors by including an ordinal measure derived from
Daniel Elazar's assessment of distinct American regional cultures that are
defined by decades of migration patterns. Scores representing each state's
political culture range over a nine-point continuum from 'moralistic' to
'traditionalistic.'65 Residents of states with moralistic cultures (parts of New
England, and much of the west) are expected to place greater value on
participation, particularly 'amateur' and non-partisan participation,66whereas
residents of traditionalist states (much of the south) may accept more elitism and
hierarchy.67 If residents of moralistic states have greater familiarity with or
regard for participatory politics we might expect them to have higher levels of
efficacy.
RESULTS

We have coded the dependent variables such that higher scores are associated
with a more efficacious reply. Looking first at the OrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS)
coefficients generated from our models, we find evidence in Table 1 that
respondents in states that frequently use direct democracy are more likely to
claim they have resources and skills that we might expect to be advantageous
- or at least desirable - for democratic citizens. They are more likely to claim
to have a good understanding of political issues, are more likely to consider
themselves qualified to participate in politics, and are more likely to feel that
they are better informed about politics than other people. The one test that fails
to reject the null hypothesis about direct democracy is in the expected direction,
but fails to attain statistical significance. On balance, however, the estimate of
the summary index of internal efficacy demonstrates that respondents are more

64 Fora discussionof this
thesis,andof the geographicdistributionof distinctpoliticalcultures,
see DanielElazar,AmericanFederalism:A ViewfromtheStates(NewYork:HarperandRow, 1984).
65 Forthe stateculturemeasure,see IraSharkansky,'The
Utilityof Elazar'sPoliticalCulture:A
ResearchNote', Polity,2 (1969), 66-83. Forotherapplicationsof this variable,see DavidLowery
andLee Sigelman,'PoliticalCultureandStatePublicPolicy:TheMissingLink', WesternPolitical
Quarterly,35 (1982), 376-84; JohnBaker,'Exploringthe "MissingLink":PoliticalCultureas an
Explanationof the OccupationalStatus and Diversity of State Legislators',WesternPolitical
Quarterly,43 (1990), 597-611. Elazaralso includesan 'individualistic'culturein the centreof this
continuum,and suggests(at p. 136) thatthe measureis one dimensional,as does Sharkansky(at
p. 70).
66 Elazar,AmericanFederalism,at p. 118.
67 Elazar,AmericanFederalism,at p. 119.
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likely to see themselves as competent citizens when living in an institutional
context that makes active use of direct legislation. These findings stand in
contrast to studies of participation in representative elections that find voting to
have no effect on internal efficacy.68
An alternative version of the model (not reported in the table) used a
non-linear specification for frequency of initiatives to test if the effect on
efficacy is muted or reversed at higher-levels of use.69 For each internal efficacy
item, as well as the internal efficacy index, the non-linear terms were statistically
insignificant. On one item (qualified to participate), the initial non-linear
specification was significant. This effect, however, appears to be driven by
respondents from California, one of the highest initiative-use states. When a
dummy variable representing California is added to the linear and non-linear
estimation of this attitude, the non-linear effect of initiative use becomes
insignificant while the linear effect continues to predict positive attitudes about
being qualified to participate. Californians, however, are significantly less likely
to see themselves as well qualified in an estimation of the linear effect of
initiative use, but they do not differ from the rest of the sample on all other
measures of internal or external efficacy. When the California dummy is added
to each of the other estimations (not reported here), there is no significant effect
for California, and the linear effects of initiative use on efficacy reported in
Table 1 remain unchanged.70 Thus, apart from the single estimation finding that
Californians feel less qualified, there is no evidence that initiative use has
reached levels that have a negative impact on our measures of efficacy.
The substantive magnitude of the effect of initiative use on a respondent's
internal efficacy index score in Table 1 (0.0056) can be expressed when the
coefficient is multiplied by a state's use of initiatives. For example, the mean
score on the internal efficacy index is 11.3. With all independent variables held
constant a respondent from California (a high initiative use state) had a score
about 1.3 points higher than a respondent from New York (which has no
initiatives).7" Residence in a state with a history of high initiative use then, is
associated with an internal efficacy score about 10 per cent beyond the mean.
In contrast a one category increase on the education measure - which is equal
to the difference between having a two-year or a four-year college degree - is
associated with a score 0.811 points higher (or about 8 per cent above the
mean).72
68 Finkel,'TheEffectsof
on PoliticalEfficacy',p. 461; Finkel,'ReciprocalEffects
Participation
of Participation
on PoliticalEfficacy',p. 908.
69
Where Y = = a + #*(frequency) - #*(frequency*frequency) + /*X

...

The sameis truewhennon-linearestimates,andestimateswithdummyvariablesfor California, are used to re-estimatethe modelsreportedin Table 2. The non-linearspecificationand the
additionof dummiesfor California,moreover,do nothingto improvemodel fit beyondthe linear
specificationreportedin Table 1 or Table2.
7' California'shistoricexperienceequals232 initiatives(232 * 0.0056 = 1.29).
72 The educationmeasureis an ordinalratherthanintervalmeasure.Thus,it cannotbe knownif
the effect of a changefrom3 (highschoolcompleted)to 4 (someeducationbeyondhighschoolbut
no higherdegree)on the scaleis thesameas a changefrom5 (anAA degree)to 6 (a BA/BSdegree).
70
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There are also some notable effects for other institutional factors here.
Respondents who identified with a party whose US Senate candidate was
defeated in their state are generally less efficacious. Having voted for one of the
losing presidential candidates is also associated with lower levels of internal
efficacy on all but one of the measures. We also find that living in a state with
divided government is associated with feeling less informed. The effects of
being a loser in the electoral arena and residing in a state with divided
government run in the opposite direction of the effects of direct democracy in
every estimation, but the effect of divided government on the index of internal
efficacy is not significant.
Among variables that account for political/attitudinal factors, there is
evidence in most estimations that lack of a strong party anchor (represented by
'pure independents') is associated with less efficacy. Most of the variables that
account for social and demographic traits are also important, with education and
gender significant in every estimation. Increased education, as anticipated,
provides a significant boost to citizens' perceptions of their political abilities.
The effects of race and age appear to be less consistent, with race having little
influence. There is partial evidence, however, that frequent use of direct
democracy may have an adverse effect on non-whites' perceptions of their
capabilities as citizens. The interaction term reflects that non-whites are less
likely to see government as uncomplicated if they live in states that use
initiatives more frequently. Non-whites residing in higher-use initiative states
also have lower scores on the summary index of internal efficacy, but the effect
is not statistically significant. The measure controlling for state political culture,
furthermore, is also related to internal efficacy. Contrary to our expectations,
respondents living in traditionalistic states are more confident that they are
qualified to participate and do a good job in office, and score higher on the
internal efficacy measure than residents of the most moralistic states. The
important point here is that the indicator of state initiative use remains a
significant predictor of efficacy even when variation in state culture - as defined
by historic migration patterns - is accounted for.73
Table 2 illustrates that our estimates of external efficacy - or perceptions of
governmental responsiveness - also support the hypothesis that more frequent
direct democratic practice leads citizens to have a greater sense that government
is responsive. Citizens residing in higher-use initiative states are more likely to
claim that 'people like [them]' have a say about what 'the government' does,
and are more likely to claim that 'public officials' care about what 'people like
[them]' think. As in Table 1, non-linear specifications of the effect of initiative
73 A discussionaboutwhy residentsof traditionalistic
stateshave higherefficacyis beyondthe

useremains
thesamewhenthisvariable
is included
or
scopeof thisarticle.Theeffectof initiative
omitted.We shouldalsonotethatthesemodelswerere-estimated
witha measureof state-level
residentialmobility(100 - per cent bornin state, 1990). This variablewas not significantin any
estimation.It was mildlycollinearwith the stateculturemeasure,andis not includedin the results
reportedhere.
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TABLE

1

Direct Democracy and Citizen Attitudes about their Political Abilities
Govt. not
Complicated

Qualf. to
Particip.

Do Good
Job

0.0015**
(0.0006)
- 0.209*
(0.092)
- 0.242**
(0.090)
- 0.097
(0.114)

0.0017**
(0.0006)
- 0.419**
(0.095)
- 0.257**
(0.094)
- 0.024
(0.118)

0.0008
(0.0006)
- 0.139
(0.098)
- 0.310**
(0.097)
- 0.080
(0.121)
- 0.062
(0.128)
- 0.097
(0.137)
- 0.249*
(0.134)
- 0.042
(0.040)
- 0.001
(0.047)

Institutional Variables
Frequency of
Initiative Use
Presidential
Loser
Senate
Loser
Divided Govt.

-

-

-

Political Variables
Strong Democrat

- 0.079
(0.120)

0.130
(0.124)

Strong Republican

0.270*
(0.128)
- 0.113
(0.125)
- 0.059
(0.038)
- 0.032
(0.044)

0.184
(0.133)

Pure Independent
National Economy
Worse
State Economy
Worse

- 0.391**
(0.131)
- 0.018
(0.039)
- 0.056
(0.046)
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-

-

-

Social Variables
Non-white*
Freq. of Initiative
Age

- 0.0029t
(0.0015)
- 0.001

(0.002)

(0.002)

Female

- 0.177*

- 0.355**

- 0.376**

-

(0.079)
0.002
(0.022)
0.184
(0.128)
0.252**
(0.024)

(0.082)
0.062**
(0.022)
0.200
(0.133)
0.202**
(0.025)

(0.084)
0.045*
(0.023)
0.313*
(0.136)
0.181**
(0.025)

-

2.40**
(0.333)

3.19**
(0.346)

2.90**
(0.355)

(0.002)

State Political
Culture
Non-white
Education
Constant
Number of Cases
Adjusted R2

0.001
(0.001)
- 0.006*

- 0.001
(0.001)
- 0.007**

916

916

915

0.146

0.157

0.107

Source: 1992 NES Post-electionstudy, Inter-UniversityConsortiumfor Social and Political Research,Ann Arbor,Mich. S
are available from the authors.
t Significantat p < 0.10 (two-tail).
* Significantat p < 0.05 (two-tail).
** Significantat p < 0.01 (two-tail).
Note: Table entries are OLS regressioncoefficients. Standarderrorsare in parentheses.Dependentvariables= NES vari
See Appendix (in web version of this article) for coding. InternalEfficacy is a summaryindex of these four items.
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TABLE

2

Direct Democracy
Responsiveness

and Citizen Attitudes about Governmental

Has Say
in Govt.
Institutional Variables
Frequency of

0.0022**

Officials
Care
0.0012*

External
Efficacy
0.0026*:

Initiative Use
Presidential

(0.0006)
- 0.312**

(0.0006)
- 0.401**

(0.0008)
- 0.377**

Loser
Senate
Loser
Divided Govt.

(0.105)
- 0.053
(0.103)
- 0.349**
(0.130)

(0.097)
- 0.045
(0.096)
- 0.198t
(0.120)

(0.134)
- 0.098
(0.132)
- 0.436**
(0.166)

- 0.020

- 0.054

Political Variables
Strong Democrat

Strong Republican
Pure Independent
National Economy

Worse
State Economy
Worse

Social Variable
Non-white*
Freq. of Initiative
Age

State Political
Culture
Non-white

(0.175)
- 0.018

(0.146)
- 0.091
(0.144)
- 0.110*

(0.136)
0.005
(0.133)
- 0.083*

(0.187)
- 0.187
(0.183)
- 0.143*

(0.043)
- 0.055

(0.040)
- 0.118*

(0.056)
- 0.032

(0.050)

(0.047)

(0.064)

- 0.001
(0.001)
- 0.001

(0.002)

(0.145)
0.192**
(0.027)
3.97*
(0.380)

Education
Constant
Number of cases
Adjusted R2

(0.127)
0.342*

- 0.022
(0.090)
- 0.043t
(0.025)
- 0.031

Female

0.026

(0.136)
0.133

- 0.0029t
(0.0016)
0.001

(0.002)

0.159*
(0.083)
- 0.031
(0.023)
- 0.019

(0.135)
0.142**
(0.025)
3.24**
(0.352)

- 0.001
(0.002)
- 0.004

(0.003)

- 0.081
(0.115)
- 0.047
(0.032)
0.040

(0.186)
0.128**
(0.035)
6.69**
(0.487)

916

913

913

0.083

0.075

0.081

Source: 1992 NES Post-electionstudy, Inter-UniversityConsortiumfor Social and Political
Research, Ann Arbor, Mich. Study No. 6067. SPSS code to estimate the models is available from

the authors.
t Significant at p < 0.10 (two-tail). * Significant at p < 0.05 (two-tail). ** Significant at p < 0.01
(two-tail).

Note:TableentriesareOLS regressioncoefficients.Standarderrorsarein parentheses.Dependent
variables = NES variables V926102 and V926103. The index is a sum of these two variables (see
Appendix in web version of paper for coding).
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use on external efficacy (not reported) were statistically insignificant. Thus, we
find no clear evidence that a history of high levels of initiative use might
overwhelm citizens.
Again, the substantive magnitude of the effect of initiative use is not trivial,
particularly when compared to the relatively limited effect that variation in
formal education has on external efficacy. Consider that the mean score on the
summary index of external efficacy is 5.4. Using estimates of this index from
Table 2, a respondent from California would be predicted to have a score 0.6
points higher74 than a respondent from a non-initiative state. If this effect is
considered as added to the mean external efficacy score, it would produce a score
11 per cent above the mean. A shift from a two-year to a four-year degree (or
from a BA/BS to an advanced degree), in contrast, is associated with only a
0.127 increase on the external efficacy index, which is equal to being about 2
per cent above the mean. With one of the external efficacy items, however, the
effect of frequent use of initiatives operates differently on non-whites.
Non-whites living in states that use more initiatives are less likely to claim that
'public officials' care about what they think. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that direct democracy, by producing outcomes that harm minorities,
has a negative effect on minority citizens' attitudes about having influence in
government.
Again, in Table 2 we also see that presidential electoral outcomes shape a
citizen's perceptions of how responsive the government is to them personally.
Respondents living in states with divided government are significantly less
likely to claim they have a say. Overall, however, our models do a better job
explaining variance in internal efficacy than external efficacy. Gender, age and
lack of strong partisanship, which were significant in most estimations of
internal efficacy, have less of a role in estimates of external efficacy.
DISCUSSION

Our findings are consistent with the theory that direct participatory models of
democracy may encourage a greater sense of efficacy, and possibly, civic
engagement. People living in states that use more initiatives tend to have more
positive views of their own political abilities and look more favourably on the
responsiveness of government. We also find a pattern that is consistent with
recent work examining how democratic institutions influence citizens'
perceptions of politics. Being on the losing side of candidate elections tends to
make citizens have less positive attitudes about their political abilities and have
less positive attitudes about governmental responsiveness.
Institutional effects are not the only things that shape a citizen's perceptions
about how they influence government. Other factors, most notably education,
also contribute to feelings of political efficacy. But the findings here indicate
that use of state-level initiatives may contribute to American democracy
generally by instilling a greater sense that citizens have the ability to shape what
74

AS in fn. 4 (232 * 0.0026 = 0.603).
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their governments do. The substantive magnitude of the effect, moreover, rivals
that of education, which has been demonstrated to be a consistent predictor of
efficacy.75 An extension of our logic suggests that citizens who consistently see
themselves on the losing end of initiative contests, like those on the losing end
of candidate contests, may have lower levels of political efficacy. Although we
do not have direct measures of a respondent's support for various ballot
measures, we find some indirect evidence of this effect. Non-white respondents
residing in initiative states are less efficacious on some, but not most, of the
instruments used to measure efficacy here.
It remains to be established what effect this increased sense of efficacy may
have on participation in politics, and on other attitudes. It is also difficult to
establish whether our findings reflect citizen perceptions that are shaped by
actual policies enacted via initiative (or via legislatures operating under the
threat of initiatives), or whether attitudes merely represent some response to a
less consequential 'sound and fury' of initiative politics. That is, a democratic
process of 'assured listening' thatprovides only an illusion of political influence,
without actually altering policies, may also shape attitudes. It is possible then,
that citizens may receive a false sense of empowerment from the use of
initiatives if ballot measures have no consequence on policy, or if these
measures advance policies that are inconsistent with the preferences of most
citizens in a state. We do not expect that this is the case, however. There is
mounting evidence that direct democracy does influence legislative behaviour
by encouraging legislators to adopt policies that more closely mirror mass
preferences.76 It seems reasonable to expect that a significant number of citizens
are aware of this in direct democracy states and, thus, feel a greater sense of
political efficacy than citizens in non-initiative states. In an era when cynicism
about politics is high, these findings should not be seen as trivial.
Finally, we must acknowledge two caveats. First, the causal argument we
offered could be reversed. Citizens may use their rights to the initiative in places
where they are more efficacious, rather than having such initiatives cause them
to feel more competent. Since our data are drawn at the mass level, however,
we expect that our findings reflect citizens responding to initiatives that they
probably did not initiate. Secondly, the level of analysis we employ could affect
our results. As noted above, initiatives have been used more frequently in the
United States in recent decades while efficacy has been in decline. This would
suggest that frequent use of direct legislation - although associated with
cross-sectional differences at a point in time - probably does not arrest secular
declines in citizen efficacy. Direct democracy as practised in the United States
might thus explain important differences in citizen attitudes across space, but
not necessarily across time.
75 On the effect of education on efficacy, see Verba, Burns and Schlozman, 'Knowing and Caring
about Politics'; Abramson, Political Attitudes in America; Cassel and Hill, 'Explanations of Turnout

Decline';HayesandBean, 'PoliticalEfficacy'.
76 Gerber,'LegislativeResponseto the Threatof PopularInitiatives';Gerber,'Legislatures,
Initiatives,andRepresentation';
Matsusaka,'FiscalEffectsof the VoterInitiative'.
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